Commitment of Sexual Psychopaths and the Requirements of Procedural Due Process by Sullivan, Peter
Fordham Law Review 
Volume 44 Issue 5 Article 2 
1976 
Commitment of Sexual Psychopaths and the Requirements of 
Procedural Due Process 
Peter Sullivan 
Follow this and additional works at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr 
 Part of the Law Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Peter Sullivan, Commitment of Sexual Psychopaths and the Requirements of Procedural Due Process, 44 
Fordham L. Rev. 923 (1976). 
Available at: https://ir.lawnet.fordham.edu/flr/vol44/iss5/2 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by FLASH: The Fordham Law Archive of Scholarship and 
History. It has been accepted for inclusion in Fordham Law Review by an authorized editor of FLASH: The Fordham 
Law Archive of Scholarship and History. For more information, please contact tmelnick@law.fordham.edu. 
COMMENTS
COMIITMENT OF SEXUAL PSYCHOPATHS AND THE
REQUIREMENTS OF PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS
I. INTRODUCTION
States have defined a sexual psychopath as one who is predisposed to the
commission of sex crimes and who is dangerous to society.' A psychopath is
not characterized as either criminal 2 or insane.3 Procedures for the determina-
tion of sexual psychopathy in the United States have been inconsistently
applied because of the clash of two important competing forces-societal
interest and individual liberty.
Societal interest manifests itself in two principal ways: police power and the
doctrine of parens patriae. The state can imprison a psychopath by virtue of
its police power, 4 which is founded upon the right of society to protect itself
from potentially dangerous individuals.- People unfamiliar with this type of
1. E.g., Cal. Welf. & Inst'ns Code § 6300 (West 1972) provides a representative definition of
sexual psychopathy: "As used in this article, 'mentally disordered sex offender' means any person
who by reason of mental defect, disease, or disorder, is predisposed to the commission of sexual
offenses to such a degree that he is dangerous to the health and safety of others."
2. E.g., Ex parte Keddy, 105 Cal. App. 2d 215, 217-18, 233 P.2d 159, 161 (2d Dist. 1951) (-A
'sexual psychopath' is not committed because he is guilt)' of a crime"); People v. Capoldi. 10 IIl.
2d 261, 266, 139 N.E.2d 776, 778 (1957) (trial on issue of mental disorder not part of criminal
procedure); Commonwealth v. Gomes, 355 Mass. 479, 484, 245 N.E.2d 429. 432 (1969) (proceed-
ing is civil in nature); State v. Madary, 178 Neb. 383. 388-90. 133 N.W.2d 583, 587.88 (1965)
(statutes provide for civil commitment); In re Mundy, 97 N.H. 239, 240. 85 A.2d 371, 372 (1952)
(psychopathic commitment is not a criminal matter); State v. Labor, 128 Vt. 597, 598. 270 A.2d
154, 155 (1970) (psychopathy proceeding not a criminal action).
3. E.g., People v. Tipton, 90 Cal. App. 2d 103, 202 P.2d 330, 331 (3d Dist. 1949) (persons
declared to be psychopaths are not necessarily adjudged insane); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 917.13 (1973);
111. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 105-1.01 (Smith-Hurd 1970) (mental disorder); Iowa Code Ann. § 225A.1
(1969) ("suffering from a mental disorder and . . .not a proper subject for the schools for the
mentally retarded or for commitment as a mentally ill person .... "); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 202.700
(Vernon 1972) ("not insane or feebleminded"); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 71.06.010 (1975)
("hereditary, congenital or acquired condition affecting the emotional or volitional rather than the
intellectual field"); see Cross v. Harris, 418 F.2d 1095, 1098-99 (D.C. Cir. 1969) (mentally ill
patients can not be committed under psychopathy statute).
4. See, e.g., State ex rel. Fulton v. Scheetz, 166 N.V.2d 874. 878 (Iowa 1969) (one object of
the sexual psychopathy statute is to sequester persons who may be dangerous).
5. Note, Due Process and the Development of "Criminal" Safeguards in Civil Commitment
Adjudications, 42 Fordham L. Rev. 611, 613-14 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Criminal Safeguards];
Developments in the Law--Civil Commitment of the Mentally I1. 87 Harv. L. Rev. 1190.
1324-29 (1974) [hereinafter cited as Civil Commitment]. While a society can protect itself, the
Supreme Court in O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975), held that absent an actual
finding of dangerousness, an insane person may not be deprived of liberty. This same rationale is
applicable to the psychopath. If he is not dangerous--some commentators argue that not all
psychopaths are dangerous, see note 12 infra and accompanying text-state police power alone
cannot justify commitment of the psychopath. Nor may the states simply set lower standards for
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personality regard a psychopath as highly dangerous, equating a sex offender
with the sex fiend who habitually and brutally preys upon children and
women. 6 As a result of these fears, and in the exercise of the state's police
power, a body of law has arisen in some states whereby a person who is
judicially determined to be a psychopathic sex offender can be sentenced to
the equivalent of life imprisonment7 with little hope of release or parole.8
Societal interest is also reflected in the parens patriae doctrine. Parens
patriae is the right and obligation of the state, acting as protector of its
people, to help its citizens. 9 Treatment of psychopaths has been included
under this obligation.' 0
a determination of dangerousness. In this case, there would be constitutional problems with the
definition of dangerousness and when it might be applied.
6. See People v. Hector, 104 Cal. App. 2d 392, 397-99, 231 P.2d 916, 920 (2d Dist. 1951)
(Doran, J., dissenting). See also N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 173-A:1 (Cum. Supp. 1975) ("It is hereby
declared that the frequency of sex crimes within this state necessitates that appropriate measures
be adopted to protect society more adequately from dangerous sexual offenders .... .");
Comment, Toward a Less Benevolent Despotism: The Case for Abolition of California's MDSO
Laws, 13 Santa Clara Law. 579, 581-83 (1973) [hereinafter cited as Less Benevolent Despotism.
7. E.g., Cal: Welf. & Inst'ns Code § 6316 (West Supp. 1975); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann.
§ 16-13-203 (1973); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 123A, § 5 (1972); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2947.25(E)(2)
(Page 1975).
8. While all states allow for release upon recovery, it has been determined that it is extremely
difficult to predict future sexual behavior. The psychiatrist reporting on the parole issue normally
takes a conservative position and does not deem the patient recovered unless circumstances
clearly indicate complete recovery. T. Szasz, Psychiatric Justice 72-74 (1965). Since this is seldom
the case, the sex offender remains in commitment. In re Kramer, 257 Cal. App. 2d 287, 291, 64
Cal. Rptr. 686, 689 (2d Dist. 1968). In states such as California the mental hospitals can be
similar to prisons with the patient being treated like a criminal. People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d
338, 365, 535 P.2d 373, 390-91, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509, 526-27 (1975).
9. See Criminal Safeguards, supra note 5, at 615-16; Civil Commitment, supra note 5, at
1207-12. See generally Laves, The Prediction of "Dangerousness" as a Criterion for Involuntary
Civil Commitment: Constitutional Considerations, 3 J. Psychiatry & Law 291, 296-98 (1975).
10. E.g., State v. Noll, 171 Neb. 831, 108 N.W.2d 108, 112 (1961) (treatment of the
psychopath is basis for commitment); Sevigny v. Burns, 108 N.H. 9:, 227 A.2d 775 (1967) (one
aim of statute is to benefit defendant by cure); State v. Newell, 126 Vt. 525, 526, 236 A.2d 656,
658 (1967) (a purpose of sex offender statute is to advance interest of psychopath); State v. Torpy,
52 Wis. 2d 101, 109, 187 N.W.2d 858, 863 (1971) (an object of act is to provide treatment);
Criminal Safeguards, supra note 5, at 613-17; Civil Commitment, supra note 5, at 1207-22.
Absent treatment, a psychopath may not be committed under this doctrine. Even though some
states, in theory, provide for treatment and commit psychopaths expressly for that purpose.
treatment of psychopaths has been illusory in practice. See People v. Feagley, 14 Cal, 3d 338, 535
P.2d 373, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1975). Right to treatment has been the subject of many court
decisions in recent years. E.g., Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated on
other grounds, 422 U.S. 563 (1975); In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 658-60 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Rouse v.
Cameron, 373 F.2d 451 (D.C. Cir. 1966); Wyatt v. Stickney, 344 F. Supp. 373 (M.D. Ala. 1972),
aff'd in part, 503 F.2d 1305 (5th Cir. 1974); People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338, 535 P.2d 373, 121
Cal. Rptr. 509 (1975) (right to treatment arose from statutory provision). For discussions of the
right to treatment see, e.g., Criminal Safeguards, supra note 5; Civil Commitment, supra note 5;
Comment, Due Process for All-Constitutional Standards for Involuntary Civil Commitment and
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A countervailing influence is the concept of individual liberty which, inter
alia, requires that no person be taken from society unless he poses a definite
threat to it." Commentators have argued that a sex offender who is not
dangerous and poses no threat to society should not be deprived of his
freedom merely because he is sexually different. 12 In this context individual
rights outweigh those of society.
Because commitment of a psychopath is the subordination of individual
liberty to the interests of the state, it is particularly important that the
psychopath be given procedural due process protections in commitment
proceedings.' 3 Ironically, fundamental due process rights have not always
been fully accorded to the sex offender in such proceedings.' 4 Courts have
only recently begun to infuse the sexual psychopathy laws with some of the
basic constitutional guarantees of due process. The Supreme Court of Califor-
nia in several recent decisions, for example, has attempted to provide for
more adequate legal treatment of sex offenders.'- Thus, in California the
Release, 34 U. Chi. L. Rev. 633 (1967); Comment, Civil Restraint. Mental Illness. and the Right
to Treatment, 77 Yale L.J. 87 (1967). See generally Hearings on Constitutional Rights of the
Mentally Ill before the Subcomm. on Constitutional Rights of the Senate Comm on the
Judiciary, 91st Cong.. 1st Sess. (1969); id.. 91st Cong.. 2d Sess. (1970).
11. See generally B. Schwartz, Constitutional Law 193-94 11972).
12. Studies have shown that the sexual psychopath is neither a habitual offender, nor a
criminal who progresses to more serious offenses. Tappan, Some NMyths About the Sex Offender.
19 Fed. Probation 7, 8-10 (June 19551. Furthermore, most sex offenders are convicted of
"nuisance" crimes such as voyeurism and indecent exposure. The Mentally Disabled and the Law
341-75 (rev. ed. S. Brakel & R. Rock 1971). Sex offender statutes do not usually encompass
crimes involving rape or homicidal acts. Tappan, supra, 7-8; see People v. Burnick. 14 Cal. 3d
306, 328, 535 P.2d 352, 368, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488, 504 (1975). See generally Jackson v Indiana.
406 U.S. 715, 733 (1972); Laves, The Prediction of "'Dangerousness" as a Criterion for Involun-
tary Civil Commitment: Constitutional Considerations. 3 J. Psychiatry & Law 291 (1975).
13. See People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338, 346-48, 535 P.2d 373. 377-78. 121 Cal Rptr 509,
513-14 (1975). There is a potential for great abuse of commitment proceedings by governmental
authorities. The Soviets often commit dissidents to -mental hospitals" in order to "cure" them
Chief Judge David L. Bazelon, United States Court of Appeals. District of Columbia. has
written, "As I read the Russian case studies it became clear to me that, if authentic, they were
indeed an example of the potential for abuse of the psychiatrist's power to diagnose mental illness.
allegedly on the basis of his medical expertise but actually on the basis of a hidden political or
social agenda." Bazelon, Forward, 13 Santa Clara Law. 367 (1973). See generally Goldstein.
Compulsory Treatment in Soviet Psychiatric Hospitals: A XView from the Inside. 19 Int'l J. of
Offender Therapy and Comparative Criminology 121 (1975); Laves. The Prediction of -Danger-
ousness" as a Criterion for Involuntary Civil Commitment: Constitutional Considerations. 3 J
Psychiatry & Law 291, 299-302 (1975).
14. Only a few states grant the psychopath a jury trial, counsel at all stages of the
proceedings, right against self-incrimination, and a standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
in determining his psychopathy. See note 80 infra. No case has been discovered where the
psychopath is given such basic "criminal" rights such as the right against improper search and
seizures.
15. See People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338. 535 P.2d 373, 121 Cal. Rptr 509 (1975); People v
Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 535 P.2d 352, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1975); see People v. Bonneville, 14
Cal. 3d 384, 535 P.2d 404, 121 Cal. Rptr. 540 (1975) (mem.).
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alleged psychopath facing commitment proceedings now has the right to a
unanimous jury trial,' 6 and a right to the standard of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt for determination of psychopathy.' 7  Furthermore, the
California courts now deem such proceedings (formerly considered civil)
criminal in nature. Is In light of this reclassification, the offender may have the
opportunity of obtaining the full panoply of rights available to one facing
criminal charges. 19
This Comment will examine state procedures for the commitment of sex
offenders in light of constitutional requirements of procedural due process and
will analyze the methods by which various states attempt to balance state
interest against the rights of the individual. It is suggested that state proce-
dures for psychopathic commitment fall into three categories: 1) Alternative
Sentence Commitment,2 0 2) Special Proceeding Commitment, 21 and 3) Miscel-
laneous.
2 2
16. People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338, 342, 535 P.2d 373, 375, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509, 511 (1975).
17. People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 310, 535 P.2d 352, 355, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488, 491
(1975).
18. Id. at 318, 535 P.2d at 359, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 495.
19. This full panoply of rights theoretically consists of those rights which are procedurally
required under the due process clause for criminal prosecutions. United States ex rel. Gercliman
v. Maroney, 335 F.2d 302, 312 (3d Cir. 1966); see Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 609-10
(1967); note 56 infra and accompanying text.
20. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. §§ 17-244 to -245 (1975); N.J. Stat. Ann. §§ 2A:164-3 to -13
(1971); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, §§ 1166-74 (1964), as amended (Supp. 1975) (declared unconstitu-
tional, United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1966) and suspended,
Pa. R. Crim. Proc. 1415 (Pa. Stat. Ann. Supp. 1975)); S.D. Compiled Laws Ann. §§ 22-22-9 to
-10 (1967); Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-49-1 to -8 (1953), as amended (Supp. 1975); Act of March 22,
1975, ch. 495, §§ 19.2-300 to -302, 1 Va. Acts of Assembly; Wyo. Stat. Ann. §§ 7-348 to -362
(1957), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1975).
21. See Ala. Code tit. 13, §§ 434-42 (1959), as amended (Supp. 1973) (subsequently declared
unconstitutional by Davy v. Sullivan, 354 F. Supp. 1320 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (three judge court, per
curiam)); Cal. IN elf. & Inst'ns Code §§ 6300-30 (West 1972), as amended (West Supp. 1975); Colo.
Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 16-13-201 to -216 (1973); D.C. Code Encycl. Ann. §§ 22-3501 to -3511 (1967);
Fla. Stat. Ann. §§ 917.13-.28 (1973), as amended (Supp. 1975); I1. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, §§ 105-1.01
to -12 (Smith-Hurd 1970), as amended (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975); Iowa Code Ann. §§ 225A. 1-. 15
(1969), as amended (Supp. 1975); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 123A, §§ 1-11 (1972), as amended (Supp.
1974); Minn. Stat. Ann. §§ 326.09-11 (1975); Mo. Ann. Stat. §§ 202.700-.770 (Vernon 1972);
Neb. Rev. Stat. §§ 29-2901 to -2910 (Supp. 1974); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 173A:I-:10 (Cum.
Supp. 1975); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §§ 2947.24-.29 (Page 1975); Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 426.510-680
(1974); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, §§ 8501-06 (1968), as amended (Supp. 1975); Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. §§ 71.06.010 to .140 (1975); Wis. Stat. Ann. §§ 973.01-.18 (1971), as amended (Spec.
Pamphlet 1975); See Ind. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-11-3.1-1 to -37 (Burns 1975).
22. Ga. Code Ann. § 77-539 (1973); Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 33-1301 to -1305 (Supp. 1975).
Several States have recently repealed their psychopathy statutes and impliedly have chosen to
deal with the sex offender by employing existing criminal laws. Among these states are:
Kansas. Michigan, North Dakota, and West Virginia. The following states never have had
psychopathy statutes: Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Delaware, Hawaii, Idaho, Kentucky, Louisi-
ana, Maine, Maryland, Mississippi. Montana, Nevada, New Mexico, New York, North
Carolina, Oklahoma, Rhode Island, South Carolina, and Texas. One commentator has classified
[Vol. 44
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II. ALTERNATIVE SENTENCE COMMITMENT
Seven states provide by statute for commitment of a psychopath after
conviction of a sex-related crime in lieu of a standard prison sentence.23 This
commitment is procedurally characterized as one of the sentencing alterna-
tives which the judge can choose in determining sentence in a criminal trial.34
This sentencing alternative may be employed only under limited conditions. It
may be imposed only upon those who, after a medical examination, have been
determined to be sexually psychopathic. Also, five of the states list the specific
sexual crimes which alone will permit the court to order a mental examination
of the psychopath prior to sentencing.25 The remaining two states do not
define the specific crimes which may trigger a court's order for an examina-
tion. 26
The statutes differ on the issue of whether the sentencing judge must or
may, at his discretion, order an examination upon conviction. Absent a
request by counsel for either side, to which the court must accede, the matter
is left to the judge's discretion in Connecticut 27 and Virginia.28 In these states,
Idaho among those states which have a specialized psychopathy statute. Comment. The
MDSO-Uncivil Civil Commitment, 11 Santa Clara Law. 169, 169-70 n.l (1970). It is
suggested that this is a misreading. See Idaho Code § 66-317 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
Arizona and Nevada provide that sex offenders register in each city in which they reside. These
statutes do not provide for commitment of psychopaths. See Ariz. Rev. Stat. Ann. §§ 13-1271 to
-1274 (1956); Nev. Rev. Stat. §§ 207.152-.157 (1957), as amended (Supp. 1973).
23. See note 20 supra.
24. The alternative feature of this type of statute is a critical element, without which the
statutes might be fatally infirm. See Davy v. Sullivan, 354 F. Supp. 1320 (M.D Ala 1973)
(Alabama statute declared unconstitutional as permitting double jeopardy in that it allowed
imposition of prison sentence after psychopath had been committed to a hospital but confined
there in a penal atmosphere).
25. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:164-3 (1971) (rape; carnal abuse; sodomy; incest; private lewdness;
public lewdness; indecent exposure; impairing the morals of a minor, attempt to commit these
offenses; assault with intent to commit rape, carnal abuse, or sodomy); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 19,
§ 1166 (1964) (indecent assault; incest; assault with intent to commit sodomy; solicitation to
commit sodomy; sodomy; assault with intent to ravish or rape); S.D. Compiled Laws Ann.
§ 22-22-9 (1967) (indecent molestation of a child); Utah Code Ann. § 77-49-1 (Supp. 1975)
(convicted of or pleading guilty to rape, sodomy, incest, indecent exposure, or attempt to commit
these offenses; assault with intent to commit rape or sodomy; child molestation); \Wyo. Stat.
Ann. § 7-348 (Cum. Supp. 1975) (indecent exposure; rape; attempt to commit rape; incest;
sodomy; seduction; taking immodest, immoral or indecent liberties with a child under eighteen
years; knowingly committing any immoral or obscene act in the presence of such a child;
knowingly causing or encouraging any such child to commit or attempt to commit with the person
convicted any immoral or indecent act).
26. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17-244 (1975) (where defendant is convicted of an offense for
which the penalty may be imprisonment in the Connecticut Correctional Institution or of sex
crime involving physical force or violence, disparity of age between an adult and a minor, or
sexual act of a compulsive or repetitive nature); Law of March 22, 1975, ch. 495, § 19.2-300, 1
Va. Act of Assembly (any criminal offense which indicates sexual abnormality)
27. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17-244 (1975).
28. Law of March 22, 1975, ch. 495, § 19.2-300, 1 Va. Acts of Assembly
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the type of crime which brings the statute into operation is broader than in
those states where the applicable crimes are expressly identified. In New
Jersey, Pennsylvania, South Dakota, Utah, and Wyoming, the judge is
required to order an examination upon conviction of the specified crimes. 29
While there is agreement among the states as to the effect of a determina-
tion of psychopathy after an examination-the judge can use such as the basis
for sentence-these seven states differ in the quantum of discretion provided
the judges in applying the alternatives. Three states allow the judge to choose
any one of several alternatives in sentencing: he may place the psychopath on
probation and require him to receive out-patient treatment; he may commit
the psychopath to a mental hospital for treatment; or he may impose the
prescribed prison sentence. 30 In three other states, when the examination has
shown the defendant to be a psychopath, the court must order commitment to
a mental hospital .
3
Since commitment under these statutes is considered a part of the criminal
process, New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and Wyoming explicitly allow parole
probation during the period of commitment. 32 Connecticut, South Dakota,
and Utah do not expressly provide for such probation. 33
The Virginia statute34 presents a different alternative to the above men-
tioned statutes. While the criminal conviction does trigger the psychopathic
examination, 35 the judge is powerless to impose psychopathic commitment in
lieu of the sentence. 36 The statute provides the judge only with another means
to determine the length of the prison sentence. With the examination in hand,
29. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:164-3 (1971); S.D. Compiled Laws Ann. § 22-22-9 (1967); Utah
Code Ann. § 77-49-1 (Supp. 1975); Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 7-348 (Cum. Supp. 1975). Pennsylvania
also had a similar provision in its statute, Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 1167 (1964), suspended, Pa. R.
Crim. Proc. 1415 (Pa. Stat. Ann. Supp. 1975).
30. Conn. Gen. Stat. Ann. § 17-245 (1975); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:164-6 (1971); Wyo, Stat.
Ann. § 7-352 (Cum. Supp. 1975). In the sense that the court's power to commit a psychopath to a
hospital as an alternative to a prison term is within the scope of a court's broad authority to
impose sentence after conviction of a crime, no constitutional problems are raised. See Williams
v. New York, 337 U.S. 241, 250-51 (1949) (trial judge has wide discretion in sentence
determination; he can obtain pertinent information and is not restrained in the information
received).
31. Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, §§ 1166-70 (1964), suspended, Pa. R. Crim. Proc. 1415 (Pa. Stat.
Ann. Supp. 1975); S.D. Compiled Laws Ann. § 22-22-10 (1967); Utah Code Ann. § 77-49-5
(1953).
32. N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:164-8 (1971); Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 19, § 1172 (Supp. 1975); Wyo, Stat.
Ann. § 7-356 (Cum. Supp. 1975).
33. Virginia does not provide for commitment on account of sexual psychopathy. See text
accompanying note 36 infra. The psychopath who is sentenced pursuant to a criminal conviction
is allowed parole as is any criminal. Law of March 22, 1975, ch. 495, §§ 19.2-313 to -315, I Va.
Acts of Assembly.
34. Law of March 22, 1975, ch. 495, §§ 19.2-300 to -304, 1 Va. Acts of Assembly. The prior
Virginia psychopathy statute, Law of April 7, 1950, ch. 463, 1 Va. Acts of Assembly (repealed
1975), provided that on conviction of any crime indicating sexual abnormality, the judge could
order a psychiatric examination in order to aid him in sentence determination.
35. Law of March 22, 1975, ch. 495, §§ 19.2-300 to -304, 1 Va. Acts of Assembly.
36. Id. §§ 19.2-301, -304.
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the judge has the option to suspend sentence, 37 suspend the imposition of
sentence, change the term of probation, or alter the actual period of confine-
ment within the permitted statutory boundaries. If the court does lengthen the
period of probation, a hearing with counsel must be held. 38
None of the statutes within this category, except those of New Jersey 39 and
Virginia,40 expressly provides for any due process rights in the determination
of psychopathy and sentencing of a psychopath. This is because these states
categorize the commitment merely as an alternative to sentencing and not as a
separate proceeding. 4' This categorization may be in error, however. Both the
Supreme Court and the Third Circuit have rejected this classification and
have held psychopathic commitment by sentence alternative subject to due
process of law.
In United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney,*2 petitioner had been
convicted of an assault with intent to ravish. 4 3 The trial judge received a
psychiatric report prior to sentencing; held an informal sentencing hearing;
determined Gerchman to be a psychopath; and sentenced him to an indeter-
minate period of treatment in lieu of a standard sentence of imprisonment.44
The court of appeals found that the determination of psychopathy involved
an independent penal proceeding in which fundamental due process rights
were denied to the sex offender.4 - The court first distinguished the psy-
chopathy proceeding from a civil action. 46 It then reasoned that the
37. Id. § 19.2-303.
38. Id. §§ 19.2-303 to -304. Attorney for the commonwealth must also be present. While
Virginia courts have not interpreted this statute, it appears that the hearing will be an adversary
one if counsel is allowed to participate. The Virginia alternative in effect bypasses the question of
due process in psychopathy commitment proceedings. In this sense. it is distinguishable from the
other statutes in this category.
39. See note 64 infra and accompanying text.
40. It will be remembered that the Virginia statute does not require psychopathic commit-
ment at all, but merely affects the prison sentence itself. An adversary hearing is also provided if
the period of probation is to be lengthened. See note 38 supra and accompanying text.
41. See notes 23-24 supra and accompanying text. The Supreme Court has held in Williams
v. New York, 337 U.S. 241 (1949). that a convicted felon has no right to a hearing or cross
examination of witnesses in the judge's determination of sentence. The court can receive any
information which will help it reach a fair conclusion: "Under the practice of individualizing
punishments, investigational techniques have been given an important role. [Rleports have
been given a high value by conscientious judges who want to sentence persons on the best
available information rather than on guesswork and inadequate information. We must
recognize that most of the information now relied upon by judges to guide them in the intelligent
imposition of sentences would be unavailable if information were restricted to that given in open
court by witnesses subject to cross examination." Id. at 249-50 (footnote omitted)
42. 355 F.2d 302 (3d Cir. 1966).
43. Id. at 305. While most psychopaths have been determined not dangerous, see note 12
supra, Gerchman is the exception to the rule. Petitioner attacked a retarded woman in his
automobile, physically assaulted her, and tied her to a tree. Id.
44. Id. at 306-07. The judge read part of the psychiatrist's report into the record. He also
called for comments from Gerchman. his wife, mother and lawyer. Id.
45. Id. at 309.
46. Id.
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psychopathy statute was criminal in nature since it could be invoked only
after conviction of specified offenses and because it imposed a radically
different punishment-mandatory commitment for an indeterminate period
-from that imposed for the underlying felony.47
Secondly, the court found that due process guarantees could not be denied
petitioner solely on the theoretical basis that the statute was nothing more
than an exercise of judicial sentencing discretion. 48 The Third Circuit found
that the psychopathic proceeding involved "a new factual finding [that of
psychopathic behavior] which went substantially beyond the finding of guilt
of assault and battery with intent to ravish."149 These new facts were the sole
basis for the mandatory commitment.5 0 The court concluded:
The proceeding under the [Pennsylvania] Act is thus neither a civil commitment nor
a sentence . . . . It is a separate criminal proceeding which may be invoked after
conviction of one of the specified crimes. Petitioner therefore was entitled to a full
judicial hearing before the magnified sentence was imposed. At such a hearing the
requirements of due process cannot be satisfied by partial or niggardly procedural
protections. A defendant in such a proceeding is entitled to the full panoply of the
relevant protections which due process guarantees in state criminal proceedings. -
Since the statute failed to provide the defendant such rights, it was uncon-
stitutional .
5 2
The Supreme Court adopted the Gerchman reasoning in Specht v. Patter-
son.5 3 Specht, convicted of taking indecent liberties with a minor, was
sentenced under the Colorado psychopathic statute to an indeterminate period
of detention.,5 4 The Court found that the psychopathic proceeding resulting in
47. Id. at 309-10. The court found that the penal characteristics of punishment were not lost
simply because the proposed punishment goes beyond retribution. As defined by the Third
Circuit, punishment can include treatment, Id. The offender faced a potentially magnified
sentence. If he was determined not to be a psychopath he would be liable solely for a specified
maximum sentence for the underlying felony. This usually is not an indefinite period, but
commitment as a psychopath can be for an indeterminate period. Id. at 311.
48. Id. at 310-11.
49. Id. at 311.
50. Id.
51. Id. at 312; accord, United States ex rel. Wintz v. Rundle, 281 F. Supp. 85 (E.D. Pa.
1968) (additional findings of fact found present in psychopathy proceedings).
52. The Third Circuit also raised the question of the right to a jury trial. While not deciding
the question, the court strongly indicated that a jury trial would be proper procedure in this case.
355 F.2d at 313-15. It must be noted that the right to a jury trial was not selectively incorporated
into the fourteenth amendment until 1968, two years after the Gerchman decision. See Duncan v.
Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968).
53. 386 U.S. 605 (1967).
54. See id. at 607. The Colorado statute of commitment which was effective at the time of
Specht, Law of April 1, 1953, ch. 89, §§ 1-10, [19531 Colo. Laws 249-52 (repealed 1968), allowed
for an in lieu of sentence commitment after a complete psychiatric examination was given to the
defendant and after a written report was filed with the court. This statute was basically identical
with the Pennsylvania statute considered in Gerchman. Compare id., with Pa. Stat. Ann. tit. 19,
§§ 1166-70 (1964), suspended, Pa. R. Crim. Proc. 1415 (Pa. Stat. Ann. Supp. 1975). The
defective Colorado statute has been replaced by a Special Proceeding Commitment type. See note
21 supra.
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commitment was criminal in nature. It also reasoned that the statute was not
merely a sentencing alternative since it involved a new charge of psychopathic
behavior and new findings of fact.-5
While declaring the Colorado statute violative of due process, the Court
laid out the guarantees which must be provided to the psychopath in
proceedings for a determination of psychopathy:
Due Process, in other words, requires that he be present with counsel, have an
opportunity to be heard, be confronted with witnesses against him, have the right to
cross-examine, and to offer evidence of his own. And there must be findings adequate
to make meaningful any appeal that is allowed.5 6
Therefore, a broad reading of these two cases leads to the conclusion that
alternative sentence commitment cannot be classified as a mere sentence
alternative available to a judge. An independent proceeding, complete with
adequate due process procedures, must be held.5 7
These cases have not, however, led to a wholesale declaration that the
statutes are unconstitutional. Courts have narrowly construed these two
cases. In United States ex rel. Demeter v. Yeager,5 8 the Third Circuit
examined Specht and its own decision in Gerchman. Demeter, who was
challenging his psychopathic commitment, had pleaded non vult to impairing
the morals of a child.5 9 The commitment was based upon the recommenda-
tion of the examining psychiatrist that the petitioner be classified as a
psychopath.60 While the proceeding involved an independent determination
of psychopathy, which was a new finding of fact, the length of commitment
was in parity with the term of sentence permissible for the underlying
55. 386 U.S. at 608. Because of these new findings, namely, that the accused was a public
threat and a mentally ill habitual offender, the Court was able to distinguish this case from one
involving a mere probationary report. Id. at 606-08.
56. Id. at 610. Presently there is a conflict among lower courts on the question of whether the
psychopath is entitled to more rights than those enumerated in Specht. California has sought to
expand the rights, while Illinois and Massachusetts have kept them to the listed minimum. See
notes 119-61 infra and accompanying text.
New Jersey has reached the same conclusion as have both Specht and Gerchman. In State v.
Home, 56 N.J. 372, 267 A.2d 1 (1970), appellant challenged his psychopathic determination on
the basis of a denial of due process. The New Jersey court determined that psychopathic
commitment requires a full plenary hearing, since the determination of psychopathy could have
far-reaching consequences and result in a denial of an individual's liberty. Id. at 379, 267 A.2d at
4.
The Virginia Statute, see notes 34-38 supra and accompanying text, would not suffer from the
defects outlined in Specht and Gerchman. This is because there is no commitment based on a
separate determination of psychopathy. The judge can only adjust the prison term or probation
within reasonable bounds. Therefore, it might be concluded that for alternative sentence
commitment to remain within constitutional boundaries, it must do away with psychopathic
commitment altogether. But see text accompanying notes 58-66 infra.
57. This independent penal hearing comes quite close to Special Proceeding Commitment.
Thus, the questions concerning adequate due process rights raised under that type of commitment
would be relevant. See pt. III infra.
58. 418 F.2d 612 (3d Cir. 1969) (per curiam), cert. denied. 398 U.S. 942 (1970).
59. Id. at 613.
60. Id.
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
felony. 6 1 The court in Demeter determined that the statute was constitutional
because it contained two requirements. First, it provided parity of sen-
tences, 62 and the court distinguished the prior cases on this basis:
[Specht and Gerchman] do not apply here . .. [T]hey dealt with statutes which created
a special additional penalty which could extend to life imprisonment after conviction of
certain specified offenses. . . . However, under the [New Jersey statutel it cannot
extend beyond the maximum sentence for the crime involved.
6 3
Secondly, the court determined that in the case before it, the requirements of
a hearing set forth in Specht and Gerchman were met. The New Jersey statute
permitted the alleged offender a chance to rebut the psychiatrist's recommen-
dation of psychopathy, even though this hearing was not a full judicial
proceeding of an adversary nature.
6 4
Therefore, under the Demeter approach sentence parity and a rebuttal
hearing allow alternative sentence commitment to remain within the limits of
the legitimate sentencing power of a judge, so that such commitment is still a
constitutional alternative to a prison sentence. 6 5 If, however, this narrow
construction is incorrect and an adversary hearing is required, the result
would be to end the possibility of alternative sentence commitment. 6 6 Instead,
61. Id. at 614.
62. Id.; see N.J. Stat. Ann. § 2A:164-6 (1971).
63. 418 F.2d at 613-14.
64. Id. at 614. The court felt that it would be meaningless to remand the case because
petitioner was denied a rebuttal hearing. The court indicated that petitioner's subsequent conduct
showed him to have psychopathic tendencies. Id.
The New Jersey Supreme Court did not accept the argument that a mere rebuttal hearing is
sufficient. That state has required a full plenary hearing. State v. Home, 56 N.J. 372, 267 A.2d 1
(1970). But see Davy v. Sullivan, 354 F. Supp. 1320, 1326 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (three judge court,
per curiam) (parity of sentence is the only requirement).
65. None of the alternative to sentence statutes except those of New Jersey, N.J. Stat, Ann.
§§ 2A:164-3 to -13 (1971), and Virginia, Law of March 22, 1975, ch. 495, §§ 19.2-300 to -304, 1
Va. Acts of Assembly, even meet the two constitutional tests established by the Third Circuit. All
of them except Utah, Utah Code Ann. §§ 77-49-1 to -8 (1953), and Pennsylvania, Pa. Stat. Ann.
tit. 19, §§ 1166-74 (1964), as amended (Supp. 1975), suspended, Pa. R. Crim. Proc. 1415 (Pa.
Stat. Ann. Supp. 1975), conform to the requirements of sentence parity; but only New Jersey and
Virginia allow for a hearing.
66. While the two requirements of parity of sentence and rebuttal hearing now form the basic
constitutional requirements for these statutes in the Third Circuit, it is contended that this
reading of Specht and Gerchman is too narrow and any statute which employs only these two
requirements would still be questionable on due process grounds. It must be remembered that the
statutes involved in the Specht and Gerchman cases were found unconstitutional not only because
there was no parity of sentences--the statutes potentially extended the maximum sentence--but
also because the statutory procedures necessarily involved new proceedings and new findings of
fact in the determination of sexual psychopathy without adequate procedural safeguards being
guaranteed. See notes 42-57 supra and accompanying text. Even though Demeter provided for
parity and a rebuttal hearing, it could still be found unconstitutional since it did not guarantee the
accused's full panoply of rights in these new proceedings and findings of fact, in apparent
violation of both Specht and Gerchman. It is interesting to note that New Jersey did not adopt
Demeter and has required a full plenary hearing in the determination of psychopathy. See note 64
supra.
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on the question of psychopathy, a special hearing necessarily would have to
be initiated and some states have already adopted this approach.
III. SPECIAL PROCEEDING COMMITMENT
The statutes which fall into this category67 generally provide for the
commencement of sex offender proceedings after a sexual-criminal charge has
been filed by the state against the alleged sex offender or after an actual
conviction of a crime. 68 Such procedures are considered civil, distinct from
the criminal proceeding in which they originated. 69 The statutes provide that
the sex offender can be committed to a mental hospital or its equivalent for a
period of one day to life7 for the purposes of the protection of the public and
treatment of the sick offender. 7 ' In varying manners, all of the statutes
67. See note 21 supra.
68. Ala. Code tit. 15, § 436 (1958), as amended (Cum. Supp. 1973). declared unconstitutional
in Davy v. Sullivan, 354 F. Supp. 1320 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (three judge court, per curiam); Cal.
Wef. & Inst'ns Code § 6302 (West 1972); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-13-205 (1973), D.C- Code
Encycl. Ann. § 22-3504 (1967); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 917.14 (1973); I11. Ann. Stat ch. 38. § 105-3
(Smith-Hurd 1970); Iowa Code Ann. § 225A.2 (1969); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 123A, § 3 (1972); N1o-
Ann. Stat. § 202.710 (Vernon 1972); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2902 (Supp. 1974). N.H. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 173-A:4 (CuM. Supp. 1975); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2947.25 (Page 1975), Vt. Stat. Ann.
tit. 18, §§ 8501-06 (1968), as amended (Supp. 1975); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 71.06.030 (1975)
Statutes of two states, Minn. Stat. Ann. § 526.10 (Cum. Supp. 19751); Ore. Rev. Stat § 426-520
(1974), provide for separate proceedings, but require only a good faith belief that the defendant is
a psychopath in order for the district attorney to commence psychopathy proceedings
69. State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Ct.. 205 Minn. 545, 549-50. 287 N.W. 297. 300 (1939).
aff'd, 309 U.S. 270 (1940) (findings of fact in this proceeding are of psychopathic personality and
not of criminality); State v. McDaniels, 307 S.W.2d 42. 44 (Mo. Ct. App. 1957) (proceedings are
not criminal); State v. Labor, 128 Vt. 597, 598-99, 270 A.2d 154. 155 (1970) (sex offender
procedure is not criminal); Cal. "\'elf. & Inst'ns Code § 6302 (West 1972); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 917-24
(1973); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 105-3.01 (Smith-Hurd 1970); Mass. Ann. Laws ch 123A. § 3
(1972); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2902(1) (Supp. 1974); see note 124 infra. The court in Davy v.
Sullivan, 354 F. Supp. 1320, 1327-28 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (three judge court, per curiam), could not
decide if Ala. Code tit. 15, §§ 434-42 (1959). as amended (Supp. 197 1). was criminal or civil. But
cf. Hill v. Burke, 289 F. Supp. 921, 926 (W.D. Wis. 1968), aff'd, 422 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.), cert.
denied, 400 U.S. 944 (1970). Logically the proceedings should be considered distinct from
criminal proceedings since new findings of fact are necessarily involved; the court is determining
psychopathy, not whether the defendant committed a specified crime. See. e.g.. State ex rel.
Pearson v. Probate Court, supra at 549-51. 287 NA.. at 298.
70. Ala. Code tit. 15, § 438 (1959), declared unconstitutional. Davy v. Sullivan. 354 F Supp.
1320 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (three judge court, per curiam); Cal. NNelf. & Inst'ns Code § 6326 (%% est
1972); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-13-203 (1973); D.C. Code Encycl. Ann. § 22-3508 (1967); Fla-
Stat. Ann. § 917.19 (1973); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 105-8 (Smith-Hurd Supp. 1975); Iowa Code
Ann. § 225A.1 1 (1969); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 123A. § 5 (1972); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 202-730 (Vernon
1972); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2903 (Supp. 1974); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 173-A:6 (Cum. Supp.
1975); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2947.25(E)(2) (Page 1975); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 426.620 (1974); Vt.
Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 8505 (Supp. 1975); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 975.06 (Supp. 1975), amending id.
§ 975.06 (1971). But see Ind. Stat. Ann. §§ 35-11-3.1-19, -28 (Bums 1975).
71. Miller v. Overholser, 206 F.2d 415, 418-19 (D.C. Cir. 1953) (interest and purpose of
statute is treatment); State ex rel. Fulton v. Scheetz. 166 N.\\2d 874, 878 (Iowa 1969) (the
second object of the statutes is treatment); State v. Noll. 171 Neb. 831, 835-38. 108 N N- 2d
FORDHAM LAW REVIEW [Vol. 44
provide some procedural safeguards for the alleged sex offender, including a
right to notification of the pending proceeding, 72 a right to a hearing to
determine sexual psychopathy, 73 and a right to counsel at such hearing. 74
These due process requirements conform to the minimum that has been
required by the United States Supreme Court. In Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v.
Probate Court,75 an alleged psychopath committed under Minnesota law
unsuccessfully challenged the sex offender law on a due process and equal
protection basis. The Court determined that the equal protection clause did
not prohibit a state from classifying the sex offender as a special category and
providing special procedures for dealing with persons in this group, 76 the
members of which had shown that they were actually dangerous and incapa-
ble of controlling their sexual impulses. 77 The Court further determined that
petitioner's due process rights had not been violated, since Minnesota guaran-
teed defendant's rights to a hearing and counsel. 78
108, 111-12 (1961) (one basis of the laws is treatment); Sevigny v. Burns, 108 N.H. 95, 96, 227
A.2d 775, 777 (1967) (per curiam) (statute's aim is to benefit by treatment); State v. Newell, 126
Vt. 525, 526, 236 A.2d 656, 658 (1967) (purpose of the laws is to advance the interest of the
psychopaths); State v. Torpy, 52 Wis. 2d 101, 109, 187 N.W.2d 858, 863 (1971) (object of sex
statutes is to provide treatment); see Fla. Stat. Ann. § 917.13 (1973); Ohio Rev. Code Ann.
§ 2947.24 (Page 1975); Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 71.06.091 (1975).
72. Cal. Welf. & Inst'ns Code § 6303 (West 1972); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-13-206 (1973);
Iowa Code Ann. § 225.14 (1969); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 123A, § 5 (1972); Ore. Rev. Stat.
§ 426.540 (1974); see Ind. Stat. Ann. § 35-11-3.1-11 (Burns 1975).
73. Ala. Code tit. 15, § 438 (1959), declared unconstitutional, Davy v. Sullivan, 354 F. Supp.
1320 (M.D. Ala. 1973) (three judge court, per curiam); Cal, Welf. & Inst'ns Code § 6321 (West
1972); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-13-210 (1973); D.C. Code Encycl. Ann. § 22-3508 (1967); Fla.
Stat. Ann. § 917.18 (1973); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 105-5 (Smith-Hurd 1970); Iowa Code Ann.
§§ 225A.4-.9 (1969); Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 123A, § 5 (1972); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 526.10 (1975);
Mo. Ann. Stat. § 202.720(1) (Vernon 1972); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2902(1) (Supp. 1974); N.H. Rev.
Stat. Ann. § 173-A:5 (Cum. Supp. 1975); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2947.25 (Page 1975); Ore. Rev.
Stat. § 426.630 (1974); Vt. Stat. Ann. tit. 18, § 8504 (Supp. 1975); Wash. Rev. Code. Ann.
§ 71.06.170 (1975); Wis. Stat. Ann. § 975.06(1) (Supp. 1975).
74. State v. Labor, 128 Vt. 597, 598-99, 270 A.2d 154, 155 (1970) (right to counsel affirmed
by United States Supreme Court); Cal. Welf. & Inst'ns Code § 6305 (West 1972); Colo. Rev. Stat.
Ann. § 16-13-206 (1973); D.C. Encycl. Ann. § 22-3505 (1967); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 917.18 (1973); 111.
Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 105-5 (Smith-Hurd 1970); Iowa Code Ann. § 225A.5 (1969); Mass. Ann.
Laws ch. 123A, § 5 (1972); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 526.10 (1975); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 202.720(4)
(Vernon 1972); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2902(2) (Supp. 1974); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 173-A:4 (Cum.
Supp. 1975); Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 2947.25(D) (Page 1975); Ore. Rev. Stat. § 426.580 (1974);
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 975.06(1) (1971); see Ind. Stat. Ann. § 35-11-3.1-13 (Burns 1975).
75. 309 U.S. 270, 275-76 (1940).
76. Id. at 274-76.
77. Id. at 274-75.
78. Id. at 275-77. The Court indicated that while the proceedings at issue were constitutional,
implementation of the statutes conceivably could violate due process: "We fully recognize the
danger of a deprivation of due process in proceedings dealing with persons charged with insanity
or, as here, with a psychopathic personality as defined in the statute . . . [it) may be open to
serious abuses in administration and courts may be imposed upon if the substantial rights of the
persons charged are not adequately safeguarded at every stage of the proceedings." Id. at 276-77,
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Each of the Special Proceeding Commitment states provides these mini-
mum requirements of due process. 79 Some of these states accord alleged sex
offenders broader due process rights 0 by relying on the equal protection




Although generally the psychopath is not considered insane, 83 some courts
have held that where the effect of a psychopathy commitment proceeding is
identical to that of an insanity commitment proceeding,84 the due process
requirements for each must be identical unless some rational basis exists for
permitting lesser standards in the psychopathy proceedings. 8 s This position
has evolved through interpretation of two Supreme Court decisions which
have recognized the validity of arguments advocating similar due process
standards for similar procedures.
In Baxstrom v. Herold86 the Supreme Court determined that the equal
protection clause requires that all classifications of insanity commitment
proceedings be subject to identical due process standards. In Bax.strom, New
York State brought a civil commitment proceeding against petitioner, an
imprisoned convict, at the expiration of his prison term. 87 Under the New
79. In Specht v. Patterson, 386 U.S. 605 (1967). the Supreme Court reaffirmed its require-
ment that these basic due process elements be present. See notes 53-56 supra and accompanying
text.
80. People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338. 352. 535 P.2d 373. 381, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509. 517 (1975)
(unanimous jury); People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 324, 535 P.2d 352. 364. 121 Cal Rptr. 488,
500 (1975) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt); People v. Pembrock. 23 III. App. 3d 991, 995. 320
N.E.2d 470, 473 (1st Dist. 1974) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt); People v. Potter, 85 Ill. App.
2d 151, 156, 228 N.E.2d 238, 241 (4th Dist. 1967) (right to counsel at all stages of the
proceedings); In re Andrews. - Mass. 2d -, 334 N.E.2d 15. 25 (1975) (proof beyand a
reasonable doubt); State ex rel. Farrell v. Stovall, 59 Wis. 2d 148, 168. 207 N.W.2d 809, 818-19
(1973) (jury trial); Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-13-211 (1973) (proof beyond a reasonable doubt);
D.C. Code Encycl. Ann. § 22-3508 (1967) oury trial); Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38. § 105-5 (Smith-Hurd
1970) (jury trial); Iowa Code Ann. § 225A.9 (1969) (jury trial); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 202-720(4)
(Vernon 1972) (jury trial); Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2903(2)43) (Supp. 1974) Oury trial, proof beyond a
reasonable doubt); Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 426.590, 426.630(1) (1974) (jury trial); Wash. Rev. Code
Ann. § 71.06.070 (1975) (jury trial).
81. E.g., People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338, 352-58, 535 P.2d 373, 381-86, 121 Cal- Rptr.
509, 517-22 (1975); State ex rel. Farrell v. Stovall, 59 Wis. 2d 148, 207 N.W.2d 809 (1973).
82. E.g., People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306. 314-25, 535 P.2d 352. 357.64. 121 Cal. Rptr.
488, 493-500 (1975).
83. See note 3 supra and accompanying text.
84. In this Comment, "insanity commitment" is used to connote involuntary civil commit-
ment proceedings other than sexual psychopathy commitment. This includes those committed
pursuant to incompetency proceedings, emergency commitments, and commitment of imprisoned
convicts.
85. People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338, 535 P.2d 373, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1975); State ex rd.
Farrell v. Stovall, 59 Wis. 2d 148, 207 N.W.2d 809 (1973).
86. 383 U.S. 107 (1966).
87. Id. at 108.
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York statute, a jury was available to all classifications of persons subject to
civil commitment except prisoners. 88 The Supreme Court struck down the
statute as violative of equal protection, holding that:
[T]he State, having made this substantial review proceeding generally available on this
issue, may not, consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth
Amendment, arbitrarily withhold it from some.
Classification of mentally ill persons. . . may be a reasonable distinction for purposes
of determining the type of custodial or medical care . . . but it has no relevance
whatever in the context of the opportunity to show whether a person is mentally ill at
all. 89
Six years later in Humphrey v. Cady,9 0 the Supreme Court interpreted
Baxstrom as applying not only to categories within a single type of commit-
ment proceeding but to all commitment actions which contain similar proce-
dures. 9' Humphrey had been convicted under the Wisconsin sex crimes
statute and, in lieu of sentence, had been committed for the term of the
maximum sentence, one year. At the expiration of such time, he became
subject to a renewal order of commitment for a period of five years. 92 He
claimed unequal treatment of the laws, since under the sex crimes statute no
right to a jury trial was recognized in commitment proceedings, whereas
under the mental health law such right was granted. 93 Although the Court left
the determination of the facts to the court on remand, 94 it reasoned that
where two different commitment statutes are identical in purpose and effect,95
there must be a rational basis for any procedural differences which may exist
between them. 96
Neither Baxstrom nor Humphrey resolved the question of similarity be-
tween psychopathy and insanity commitment proceedings; neither case man-
dated identical procedures for the two types of proceedings. The vast majority
of states in the Special Proceeding Commitment category have not applied
the equal protection clause to provide such parity. Although courts in these
jurisdictions have consistently sustained the traditional view that sexual
88. Id. at 110-11. While a prisoner was denied the right to a jury trial on the issue of his civil
commitment, all other alleged insane persons were "expressly granted the right to de novo
review." Id. at Il1 (italics omitted).
89. Id. (emphasis in original); see Jackson v. Indiana, 406 U.S. 715 (1972).
90. 405 U.S. 504 (1972).
91. Id. at 508-09.
92. Id. at 510 n.6.
93. Id. at 508.
94. Id. at 5 14-16. The Court remanded the case for a full evidentiary hearing to determine if
arbitrary procedures were in fact employed. On remand, the case was dismissed as moot upon
stipulations of the parties. State ex rel. Farrell v. Stovall, 59 Wis. 2d 148, 163 n.41, 207 N.W.2d
809, 816 n.41 (1973).
95. See 405 U.S. at 509-10 & nn.4-6.
96. Id. at 510. The Court also intimated that it would not tolerate a situation in which the
state might arbitrarily choose to commit the defendant on one of two theories when there was no




psychopathy proceedings are not violative of equal protection, 97 it appears
that only a few have had to confront the equal protection issue in terms of the
validity of the procedural distinctions, if any, between psychopathy and
insanity commitment proceedings. 98 Wisconsin" and California" 0 courts
have determined that procedural differences between such proceedings in
their states are arbitrary and in violation of the equal protection clause.
In State ex rel. Farrell v. Stovall, 10 1 petitioner had been convicted of three
counts of indecent behavior. 10 2 He argued that the independent proceeding at
which he had been determined to be a psychopath and committed to an
indeterminate period of treatment'0 3 was in violation of his constitutional
rights, since a jury trial, granted to persons subject to insanity commitment,
was denied to him.10 4 The Wisconsin court determined that both the
psychopathy and insanity statutes required, prior to commitment, determina-
tions of mental defect, dangerousness, and amenability to treatment; in that
sense they were identical in scope. os The court rejected the state's argument
that the two statutes were rationally distinct in that the psychopathy com-
mitment proceeding, unlike the insanity proceeding, was an alternative to
penal sentencing.' 0 6 The court required that identical due process standards
be applied in both independent commitment proceedings. 10 7
97. State ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Ct., 205 Minn. 545, 287 N.W. 297 (1939), aff'd, 309 U.S.
270 (1940); State v. Ross, 96 Ohio App. 157, 121 N.E.2d 289, 293, appeal dismissed. 161 Ohio
408, 119 N.E.2d 618 (mer.), cert. denied, 348 U.S. 846 (1954) (provisions of statute
reasonable-they come within the legislative power of the state and do not transgress the
constitution). Such cases, however, usually were concerned only with the threshold question of a
state's power to make a sexual psychopathy classification and did not Involve the Issue of the
relationship between insanity and psychopathy commitments. The Supreme Court has held that
the initial classification of sex offenders itself does not violate the fourteenth amendment.
Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Ct., 309 U.S. 270, 274 (1940).
98. Iowa, Minnesota, and Missouri have enacted statutes that expressly require identical
procedures for the commitment of the mentally ill person and the sexual psychopath. Iowa Code
Ann. § 225A.15 (1969); Minn. Stat. Ann. § 526.10 (1975); Mo. Ann. Stat. § 202.770 (Vernon
1972). There is nothing to indicate whether the statutes are based on equal protection considera-
tions.
99. State ex rel. Farrell v. Stovall, 59 Wis. 2d 148, 207 N.W.2d 809 (1973).
100. People v. Feagley, 14 Cal. 3d 338, 535 P.2d 373, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1975).
101. 59 Wis. 2d 148, 207 N.W.2d 809 (1973). Farrell had brought several actions in
Wisconsin on the same basic issue. Id. at 152-53, 207 N.W.2d at 810-11. The present Wisconsin
decision was the result of the consolidation of these actions on remand from the Supreme Court.
102. Id. at 152, 207 N.W.2d at 810.
103. Id. While the decision does not reveal that an independent proceeding was commenced,
the statutes cited by the court require a hearing for determination of psychopathy. At such
hearing the alleged psychopath is allowed counsel and the opportunity to present evidence. See
Wis. Stat. Ann. § 975.06(1) (1971).
104. 59 Wis. 2d at 164-65, 207 N.W.2d at 816-17. A prior version of the psychopathic statute.
abrogated in 1951, granted a jury trial to a sex offender. Id. at 155, 207 N.W.2d at 811-12.
105. Id. at 163-64, 207 N.W.2d at 816; see Humphrey v. Cady, 405 U.S. 504, 509-10 &
nn.4-6 (1972); text accompanying notes 90-96 supra.
106. 59 Wis. 2d at 167, 207 N.W.2d at 818; see text accompanying note 95 supra.
107. This decision applied only to the initial commitment proceedings, and not to procedures
19761
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In People v. Feagley, 108 petitioner, committed for an indeterminate period
because of his compulsive desire to touch hair, 0 9 challenged the California
psychopathic commitment statute because, under the statute, he was denied
the unanimous jury trial automatically granted under another statute to
insane defendants."10 The California court found that the psychopathy and
insanity proceedings were identical; and because no rational basis existed for
the procedural distinction,"' the court required identical procedures for
both. ' 12
Thus, the equal protection clause can be used to provide significant
procedural safeguards for the psychopath in commitment proceedings when
such proceedings are identical to civil commitment proceedings in result,
when no rational distinction between the two exists, and-critically-when
the insanity proceedings themselves provide sufficient procedural safeguards.
Of course, the value of this approach would be seriously lessened where civil
commitment procedures are constitutionally inadequate.' 13
B. Criminal Classification
Another method of granting additional procedural safeguards to the
psychopath beyond the minimum already required is to consider psychopathy
commitment laws criminal in nature, thereby granting the psychopath the
ordinary rights of a criminal.' ' 4 While there is implicit precedent for this
involving the actual care and custody of those committed. 59 Wis. 2d at 170-71, 207 N.W.2d at
819-20. It appears that there is a rational distinction between psychopaths and the insane when It
comes to custody and care. Baxstrom v. Herold, 383 U.S. 107, 111 (1966).
Massachusetts has also accepted the equal protection argument in the psychopathy context. In
re Andrews, - Mass. 2d -, 334 N.E.2d 15, 21-25 (1975). In that case, however, the Supreme
Judicial Court applied the equal protection argument not to psychopaths in general but only to
those psychopaths who were committed under Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 123A, § 6 (1972). That
statute allows a prisoner already in a state detention center to be committed to an indeterminate
period as a psychopath. Id. at -, 334 N.E.2d at 22-23. It is clear, however, that the court might
in a proper case extend the equal protection reasoning to all psychopaths, There are no
distinguishing characteristics between psychopaths committed prior to imprisonment and those
psychopaths committed after some prison time has been served.
108. 14 Cal. 3d 338, 535 P.2d 373, 121 Cal. Rptr. 509 (1975).
109. Feagley was initially charged with molesting a child. There was no element of force in
the incident since one of the girls to whom he had been talking let him touch her hair and neck.
Id. at 342, 535 P.2d at 375, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 511. The charge was ultimately reduced to a simple
battery. While Feagley faced a potential life imprisonment under the commitment statute, the
criminal penalty for this battery was a fine of $1,000.00 or a six month imprisonment.
110. Id. at 342, 535 P.2d at 375, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 511. California's requirement for a
unanimous jury trial appears to go beyond the minimum necessary. Within reason states are free
to establish jury requirements. Williams v. Florida, 399 U.S. 78, 103 (1970).
111. 14 Cal. 3d at 356, 535 P.2d at 384, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 520.
112. Id. at 352-55, 535 P.2d at 381-83, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 517-19.
113. See State ex rel. Farrell v. Stovall, 59 Wis. 2d 148, 170, 207 N.W.2d 809, 819-20 (1973).
In such instances a frontal attack on the constitutionality of the psychopathy proceedings
themselves would have to be made. Such an approach is difficult. See text accompanying notes
75-77 supra.
114. Comment, The MDSO-Uncivil Civil Commitment, 11 Santa Clara Law. 169, 178-82
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theory in the decisions of other courts, only California has expressly taken this
approach. The problem of relabelling these proceedings is made complex
because psychopathy proceedings have long been termed civil in nature" s
and courts have generally refused to abandon this philosophy." 6 Further-
more, it is clear that an alleged psychopath in a commitment hearing would
not benefit necessarily if every right accorded the criminal was granted to
him. 1 7 While a reclassification of psychopathy proceedings as criminal in
nature will not resolve all procedural issues immediately, I18 an analysis of the
varying approaches to the question should clarify the nature of the problem.
In Specht v. Patterson,"9 the Supreme Court established requirements
which are necessary in psychopathy proceedings: " '[a defendant in such a
proceeding is entitled to the full panoply of the relevant protections which due
process guarantees in state criminal proceedings.' "120 The Court expressly
stated that the "panoply" must include rights to an adversary hearing,
counsel, cross-examination, confrontation of witnesses, and appeal.' 21 Even
though the statute involved in Specht theoretically was an alternative sen-
tence type, the guidelines established in that case are applicable to Special
Proceeding Commitment. 22
States in the special proceeding category provide for a hearing and separate
findings of fact in the determination of psychopathy.' 23 Because courts of
these states consider psychopathy commitment proceedings civil in nature' 24
or, at best, special proceedings, 25 they have often limited the grant of
(19-70) [hereinafter cited as Uncivil Commitment]; Less Benevolent Despotism. supra note 6. at
603-08. For discussions concerning the psychopath's right to criminal procedural safeguards in a
civil commitment proceeding, see Criminal Safeguards, supra note 5, at 621-23; Civil Commit-
ment, supra note 5, at 1295-1306.
115. See text accompanying note 69 supra.
116. See, e.g., text accompanying notes 149-50 infra.
117. See text accompanying notes 166-69 infra.
118. See text accompanying notes 161-70 infra.
119. 386 U.S. 605 (1967). See notes 53-56 supra and accompanying text.
120. 386 U.S. at 609, quoting United States ex rel. Gerchman v. Maroney, 355 F.2d 302, 312
(3d Cir. 1966).
121. Id. at 610.
122. See notes 54-55 supra and accompanying text.
123. See notes 72-74 supra and accompanying text.
124. See note 69 supra and accompanying text. E.g., Miller v. Overholser. 206 F.2d 415, 417
(D.C. Cir. 1953) (D.C. psychopathy proceeding is civil in nature); In re Newton, 357 Mass. 346,
351, 259 N.E.2d 190, 193 (1970) (application of psychopathy law results in civil commitment);
State ex rel. Sweezer v. Green, 360 Mo. 1249, 1253, 232 S.W.2d 897, 900 (1950). overruled on
other grounds, State ex rel. North v. Kirtley, 327 S.W.2d 166 (Mo. 1959) (sexual deviants subject
to restraint because of dangerousness, not because of criminal conviction); In re Moulton, 96
N.H. 370, 373, 77 A.2d 26, 28 (1950) (psychopathic commitment involving care and treatment
considered civil, and not regarded as punishment); People v. Redford, 194 Cal. App. 2d 200, 14
Cal. Rptr. 866 (4th Dist. 1961) (psychopathy laws not criminal in nature). But see Hill v. Burke,
289 F. Supp. 921, 926 (W.D. Wis. 1968), aff'd, 422 F.2d 1195 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
944 (1970) (psychopathy statutes provide for independent criminal proceeding).
125. See, e.g., Gross v. Superior Ct., 42 Cal. 2d 816, 270 P.2d 1025 (1954) (psychopathy
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criminal procedural rights to those listed in Specht. 126
On the other hand, seven jurisdictions have enacted statutes requiring
additional procedural protections for the psychopath similar to those required
in criminal actions. The District of Columbia, 12v Iowa, 28 Oregon, 129 Mis-
souri,' 30 and Washington' 3' have adopted jury trials for the psychopath.
Colorado 32 requires the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt for the
determination of psychopathy, and Nebraska 133 has incorporated both rights
in its psychopathy actions.
Also, in People v. Pembrock, 134 Illinois adopted procedural safeguards for
the sex offender beyond those specified in Specht. Pembrock, convicted of
indecent liberties with a child, argued that his psychopathy commitment was
improper because the standard of proof used to determine his condition-
preponderance of the evidence-was constitutionally deficient.' 35 The court
held that the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt was the proper
standard; 136 it relied on two United States Supreme Court cases involving
proceedings are special actions of civil nature); In re Mundy, 97 N.H. 239, 85 A.2d 371 (1952)
(not criminal nor really even an adversary civil proceeding); State v. Madary, 178 Neb. 383, 133
N.W.2d 583 (1965) (psychopaths require special consideration). The Second Circuit has stated
that because the inmate has an interest in the designation of his status, marked changes In such
designation can ndt be made without a "special proceeding," which must include the right of the
prisoner to appear and call witnesses. He must also be advised of the evidence against him,
Cardaropoli v. Norton, 523 F.2d 990, 996 (2d Cir. 1975).
126. See, e.g., State ex rel. Fulton v. Scheetz, 166 N.W.2d 874, 888-89 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1969)
(Iowa statute constitutional since it met requirements of Specht); Petition of Peterson, 354 Mass.
110, 114, 236 N.E.2d 82, 84 (1968) (statute vastly different than one struck down in Specht and
more similar to Minnesota statute upheld in Minnesota ex rel. Pearson v. Probate Court, 309
U.S. 270 (1940)); State v. Labor, 128 Vt. 597, 270 A.2d 154 (1970) (court compared Specht
requirements and Vermont law and found due process requirements met). The Eighth Circuit
found the Nebraska statute constitutional, citing the Specht requirements and the fact that the
statute provides for additional protections. Irwin v. Wolff, No. 74-1934 (8th Cir., Feb. 17, 1976);
accord, State v. Irwin, 191 Neb. 169, 214 N.E.2d 575 (1974).
127. D.C. Code Encycl. Ann. § 22-3508 (1967).
128. Iowa Code Ann. § 225A.9 (1969).
129. Ore. Rev. Stat. §§ 426.590(2), 426.630(1) (1974).
130. Mo. Ann. Stat. § 202.720(4) (Vernon 1972) (jury trial within the discretion of judge).
131. Wash. Rev. Code Ann. § 71.06.070 (1975). Illinois also provides that an alleged
psychopath can demand a jury trial. Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 38, § 105-5 (Smith-Hurd 1970).
132. Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 16-13-211(2) (1973).
133. Neb. Rev. Stat. § 29-2904 (Cum. Supp. 1974).
134. 23 Ill. App. 3d 991, 320 N.E.2d 470 (1st Dist. 1974).
135. Id. at 993, 320 N.E.2d at 471. Pembrock also raised an equal protection argument,
claiming that he was denied procedures granted criminal defendants. Id. at 996, 320 N.E.2d at
474. He also asserted that the adjudication was defective due to errors of his assigned counsel. Id.
136. Id. at 995, 320 N.E.2d at 473; accord, Stachulak v. Coughlin, 369 F. Supp. 628, 630-31
(N.D. Ill. 1973), aff'd, 520 F.2d 931 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3489 (U.S.
Mar. 1, 1976) (No. 75-608); In re Lamb, - Mass. 2d -, 334 N.E.2d 28, 33 (1975); In re
Andrews, - Mass. 2d -, 334 N.E.2d 15, 27 (1975).
Lessard v. Schmidt, 349 F. Supp. 1078 (E.D. Wis. 1972), vacated on other grounds, 414 U.S.
473 (1974) (per curiam), held that proof beyond a reasonable doubt is required In emergency
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juvenile proceedings-In re Gault'37 and In re Winship. 138
In each of these cases the Court determined that juvenile hearings, even
though "special proceedings," were subject to certain due process require-
ments similar to those in criminal actions. 139 The Court reasoned that the
youth in a juvenile proceeding, like the criminal at trial, is faced with a loss of
liberty 40 and the social stigma of conviction, 41 and thus must have the same
protections as a criminal. Gault held that these protections must include
notice,' 4 2 counsel,' 43 confrontation and cross-examination at the hearing, 44
and an adequate record of the proceeding. 14s Winship required the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard of proof in juvenile proceedings. 46
commitments. While emergency commitment is factually distinguishable from psychopathy
proceedings, this decision lends support to the argument that a higher standard of protection than
is now provided in most jurisdictions is required in psychopathy procedures. The Wisconsin
Supreme Court has acknowledged the possibility that Lessard may accurately express state law,
but has neither accepted nor rejected the holding in light of the action of the United States
Supreme Court in vacating the district -ourt decision. State ex rel. Haskins v. Dodge County Ct..
62 Wis. 2d 250, 268-69, 214 N.W.2d 575, 584-85 (1974).
Florida has accepted this higher standard of proof in insanity commitments. In re Pickles'
Petition, 170 So. 2d 603 (Fla. Ct. App. 1965). The District of Columbia, in In re Hodges, 325
A.2d 605, 607 (D.C. Ct. App. 1974), and a New Jersey lower court, in In re Perry, 137 N J. Eq.
161, 43 A.2d 885 (Ch. 1945), also have accepted the standard of proof beyond a reasonable doubt
in insanity proceedings. Kentucky, a state without a psychopathy statute, has employed this
standard of proof to lunacy commitments. Denton v. Commonwealth, 383 S.W.2d 681 (Ky. Ct.
App. 1964) (proceedings called quasi-criminal).
The New Mexico Supreme Court has rejected the proof beyond a reasonable doubt standard
and in civil commitment proceedings has adopted the standard of clear and convincing proof. In
re Valdez, 540 P.2d 818 (N.M. 1975). The standard of clear and convincing proof has also been
accepted as the applicable standard for insanity commitments in Washington. In re Levias, 83
Wash. 2d 253, 517 P.2d 588 (1973). A recent federal case has found this same standard applicable
to the insanity commitment of children. Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039, 1053 (E.D. Pa-).
stayed, 96 S. Ct. 558 (1975), appeal docketed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3445 (U.S. Jan. 27. 1976) (No.
75-1064). See note 146 infra.
137. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). The fifteen year old petitioner was committed as a juvenile delinquent
for making lewd remarks. Id. at 4. The Court found that defendant had not received prior notice
of the charges and at the hearing was denied the presence of the accusing party, counsel, and a
proper record. Id. at 10.
138. 397 U.S. 358 (1970). Winship, a twelve year old, was held to be a juvenile delinquent
after a hearing on a charge of taking S112. At the hearing he had been denied the standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. Id. at 360-61.
139. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 18-20.
140. Id. at 36; In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 366-67.
141. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 24; In re Winship, 397 U.S. at 367.
142. In re Gault, 387 U.S. at 31-34.
143. Id. at 34-42.
144. Id. at 42-57.
145. Id. at 57-58. The Second Circuit in an analogous situation has guaranteed some of the
same rights to prisoners prior to their classification as "'special cases." See Cardaropoli v. Norton.
523 F.2d 990, 994-95 (2d Cir. 1975).
146. 397 U.S. at 368; cf. Bartley v. Kremens, 402 F. Supp. 1039. 1053 (E.D. Pa.). stayed. 96
S. Ct. 558 (1975), appeal docketed, 44 U.S.L.W. 3445 (U.S. Jan. 27, 1976) (No. 75-1064)
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In Pembrock, the Illinois court recognized that a defendant's interests were
identical in both juvenile and psychopathy proceedings.1 47 Both the juvenile
and the psychopath suffer a loss of liberty and incur social stigma because of
confinement.14 8 The court recognized fundamental distinctions between
psychopathy commitment proceedings and criminal prosecution, however.
Unlike a criminal proceeding, the court reasoned, the psychopathy commit-
ment proceeding implies no moral blame% orthiness.' 49 The psychopathy
statute also provides treatment instead of punishment.15 0
It appears, then, that most of the states which have adopted procedures in
(children subject to involuntary insanity commitment guaranteed rights to: probable cause
hearing, post commitment hearing, written notice, counsel, presence at hearings, confrontation
and cross-examination of witnesses, and the standard of proof of clear and convincing evidence).
147. 23 I1. App. 3d at 994. 320 N.E.2d at 473. Two recent Massachusetts cases have arrived
at the same conclusion. In re Lamb, - Mass. 2d -, 334 N.E.2d 28 (1975); In re Andrews, -
Mass. 2d -, 334 N.E.2d 15 (1975). Both petitioners sought relief from psychopathy commitment
made after each had been committed to prison. Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 123A, § 6 (1972), as
amended (Cum. Supp. 1974), empowers the superintendent of the prison to petition the court for
commitment of an inmate if he believes the inmate to be a psychopath. The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts accepted the analogy between psychopathy and juvenile commitment and
held: "We nevertheless find that the implications of the foregoing cases, particularly Winshlp
construed In the light of Specht, lead irnexorably to the conclusion that a person who stands to lose
his freedom and to be labeled sexually dangerous is entitled to the benefit of the same stringent
standard of proof as that required in criminal cases." In re Andrews, - Mass. 2d -, 334 N.E.2d
15, 26 (1975); accord, In re Lamb. - Mass. 2d - 334 N.E.2d 28, 33-34 (1975).
148. 23 III. App. 3d at 994, 320 N.E.2d at 473; accord, In re Lamb. - Mass. 2d -, 334
N.E.2d 28, 33-34 (1975); In re Andrews, - Mass. 2d -, 334 N.E.2d 15, 27 (1975).
149. 23 Ill. App. 3d at 995, 320 N.E.2d at 473. Contra, People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306,
321. 535 P.2d 352. 362, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488, 498 (1975).
150. 23 Ill. App. 3d at 995 n.4, 320 N.E.2d at 473 n.4. Contra, People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d
306, 319-21, 535 P.2d 352, 360-61, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488, 496-97 (1975); see United States ex rel.
Stachulak v. Coughlin, 520 F.2d 931 (7th Cir. 1975), affirming 369 F. Supp. 628 (N.D. Ill.
1973), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3489 (U.S. Mar. 1, 1976) (No. 75-608). The Seventh
Circuit noted: "[SJince the Act is an alternative to a criminal prosecution, it is also in a very real
sense a penal measure." Id. at 936 n.5.
Another argument which has been raised against application of criminal protections is that in
psychopathy proceedings the state does not attempt to prove a crime, and the jury merely adopts
the opinion of the psychiatrist. See People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d at 330, 535 P.2d at 368, 121
Cal. Rptr. at 504 (1975) (rejecting argument). It is submitted that the civil in nature standard can
not be based on the assumption that the jury merely adopts the opinions of the psychiatrist.
Courts demand that the factfinder make an independent finding. Dittrich v. Brown County, 215
Minn. 234. 235-37. 9 N.W.2d 510, 512 (1943) (trier of fact is arbitrator of medical testimony); see
Malone v. Overholzer, 93 F. Supp. 647 (D.D.C. 1950). Furthermore, there is a tradition of
judicial reluctance to accept opinions of psychiatrists. People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d 306, 325-28,
535 P.2d 352, 365-66, 121 Cal. Rptr. 488, 501-02 (1975). This reluctance is not unfounded. One
commentator has found that psychiatric examinations are extremely unreliable. See Laves, The
Prediction of -'Dangerousness" as a Criterion for Involuntary Civil Commitment: Constitutional
Considerations. 3 J. Psychiatry & Law 291, 295 (1975) ("[Dliagnostic interviews [for civil
commitment lasted between 5 and 10.2 minutes. The "evidence' upon which the examiners based
their decisions to retain often, according to the author, seemed arbitrary, and in some such cases
no evidence whatsoever could be found by independent experts").
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addition to those required by Specht have not done so on the grounds that
psychopathy proceedings are criminal in nature. In contrast, however,
California has taken this approach. In People v. Burnick, ' defendant, who
had been convicted of homosexual relations with two minors, and then held to
be a psychopath at commitment proceedings, appealed on the ground that an
inadequate standard of proof had been applied in the latter proceeding.
Relying on Gault and Winship, the court determined that the standard of
proof beyond a reasonable doubt must be used in psychopathy commitment
proceedings. 152 As in Illinois, the California court noted that psychopaths,
like juveniles, suffer a loss of liberty and social stigma;3 3 but the court
appeared to go further than most other jurisdictions by impliedly categorizing
the psychopathy proceeding as criminal in nature.'5 4 The court stated:
-It is a separate criminal proceeding which may be invoked after conviction of one
of the specified crimes. Petitioner therefore was entitled to a full judicial hearing before
the magnified sentence was imposed. At such a hearing the requirements of due
process cannot be satisfied by partial or niggardly procedural protections. A defendant
in such a proceeding is entitled to the fufl panoply of the relevant protections which due
151. 14 Cal. 3d 306. 535 P.2d 352. 121 Cal. Rptr. 488 (1975).
152. Id. at 318-22. 535 P.2d at 359-62, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 495-98.
153. Id. at 318, 535 P.2d at 360, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 496; accord, Donaldson v. O'Connor. 493
F.2d 507, 520 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds,'422 U.S. 363 (1975). In Gault. the Court
stated: -Ultimately, however, we confront the reality [that the] boy is committed to an institution
where he may be restrained of liberty for years. It is of no constitutional consequence--and of
limited practical meaning-that the institution to which he is committed is called an Industrial
School. . . . His world becomes 'a building with whitewashed walls, regimented routine and
institutional hours . . . .' Instead of mother and father and sisters and brothers and friends and
classmates, his world is peopled by guards, custodians, state employees, and 'delinquents'
confined with him for anything from waywardness to rape and homicide.
"In view of this, it would be extraordinary if our Constitution did not require the procedural
regularity and the exercise of care implied in the phrase 'due process.' " In re Gault. 387 U S 1.
27-28 (1967) (footnotes omitted).
Professor Wigmore has written: "The mental condition of one whose mind is so deranged as to
require imprisonment for his own and others' good is indeed pitiable. But the mental attitude of
one who is falsely found insane and relegated to life imprisonment is beyond conception. No
greater cruelty can be committed in the name of the law." 5 Wigmore on Evidence § 1400. at 201
(Chadbourn rev. ed. 1974); see Murel v. Baltimore City Crim. Ct., 407 U.S. 355. 359 (1972)
(Douglas, J.. dissenting) (dismissal of certiorari in case involving Maryland Defective Delinquent
statute).
154. The majority decision nowhere states that the proceedings are of a criminal nature, but a
reading of the case clearly permits this view. See 14 Cal. 3d at 335. 535 P.2d at 372. 121 Cal-
Rptr. at 508 (Burke, J., dissenting).
While Massachusetts has stated that it accepted the "California" reasoning for psychopathic
commitment, it has adopted Burnick only insofar as it granted proof beyond a reasonable doubt
to the psychopath. In re Andrews, - Mass. 2d - 334 N.E,2d 15, 27 (1975). That state has not
adopted the criminal in nature standard: -We have consistently labeled c. 123A proceedings civil
and nonpunitive. . . .We adhere to that position. Nevertheless, the affixing of a -civil' label to
SDP proceedings does not answer the question of what process is due. just as the affixing of a
'civil' label did not answer that question in the juvenile delinquency context." Id. at -. 134
N.E.2d at 26.
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process guarantees in state criminal proceedings. He must be afforded all those
safeguards which are fundamental rights and essential to a fair trial ... ." The Specht
court unequivocally adopted this language as its own . ..--
Unlike some other jurisdictions, California does not believe that the Specht
requirements set the outer limits on procedural safeguards for the psy-
chopath. 5 6 In Burnick, the California court determined that under the
Specht "panoply of rights" doctrine, the standard of proof beyond a reason-
able doubt was one safeguard required in psychopathic commitment.'157 The
court thus determined that a psychopathy commitment was a criminal type of
punishment.'5 8 The court also noted that there is a moral blameworthiness
implied in sex offender proceedings; the stigma which is placed upon the
psychopath follows him everywhere. 15 9 The court therefore impliedly declined
to distinguish between criminal and psychopathy proceedings.' 60
California was the only jurisdiction found to bring due process arguments
this far. This does not mean that the California psychopathy law is free from
defects. The statute fails to distinguish between degrees of psychopathy, so
that a relatively harmless psychopathic compulsion such as voyeurism is
155. 14 Cal. 3d at 318-19, 535 P.2d at 359, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 495, quoting Specht v.
Patterson, 386 U.S. 605, 609-10 (1967) (emphasis in California opinion); see Less Benevolent
Despotism, supra note 6, at 603-04.
156. 14 Cal. 3d at 318, 535 P.2d at 359, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 495. "[I]f Specht did not prophesy
each and every step in the future development of the role that due process must play in these
commitment proceedings, it clearly pointed the way." Id.
157. Id. at 332, 535 P.2d at 369, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 505. See In re Winship, which stated that
the court should examine, weigh, and balance the procedures, consequences, and Interests
involved to determine whether a particular due process safeguard should be required. 397 U.S. at
361-64, 366. The American Civil Liberties Union has recommended this higher burden of proof,
as well as a criminal type trial, for the commitment of the insane. ACLU, Policy Statement on
Involuntary Commitment 2 (April 1974).
158. 14 Cal. 3d at 319-22, 535 P.2d at 360-61, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 496-97.
159. People v. Burnick, 14 Cal. 3d at 322-23, 535 P.2d at 362, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 498 ("He
remains forever a pariah, branded with the twin marks of mental and sexual abnormality");
accord, Donaldson v. O'Connor, 493 F.2d 507, 520 (5th Cir. 1974), vacated on other grounds,
422 U.S. 563 (1975). An analogous situation might be found in the political arena. The
presidential campaign of George McGovern was seriously hindered when it became known that
Thomas Eagleton, his vice-presidential running mate, had undergone "therapy."
160. Though certain distinctions appear valid, see text accompanying notes 162-69 infra, In
the context of the result of psychopathy proceedings, any distinction appears to be Illusory. This
is especially true in those jurisdictions in which courts have stated that the objective of
psychopathy statutes is the protection of society rather than the treatment of psychopaths. State
ex rel. Fulton v. Scheetz, 166 N.W.2d 874, 878 (Iowa Sup. Ct. 1969) (object of statute Is to
protect society by sequestering deviate); State v. Braggs, 9 Ohio Misc. 32, 221 N.E.2d 493, 49S
(Juv. Ct. 1966) (purpose of statutes is confinement of psychopaths who are dangerous to society).
This objective is the same as that in criminal prosecutions. W. La Fave & A. Scott, Jr., Criminal
Law § 5, at 21-22 (1972); see In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648, 657-58 (D.C. Cir. 1973) (criminal and
commitment statutes both have purpose of confining defendant). The state's interest In the
protection of its citizens is clearly valid. See Criminal Safeguards, supra note 5, at 613-13; Civil
Commitment, supra note 5, at 1223. It appears, however, that the state can accomplish Its
purpose and, at the same time, afford greater procedural rights to the psychopath,
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treated in the same manner as is a violent sex crime. Since there is no
classification among psychopaths all offenders are exposed to the same
potential confinement, regardless of the nature and extent of their threat to
society. 161
The California court in Burnick did not urge that all criminal due process
rights be made available in all psychopathy proceedings. ' 62 It could hardly do
so since standards must vary with the particular proceeding at issue.' 63 Even
Gault and Winship, which required certain criminal procedures to be ob-
served in juvenile proceedings, 164 did not make all criminal procedures appli-
cable to the juvenile. The court observed in Winship:
Gault decided that, although the Fourteenth Amendment does not require that the
hearing at this stage conform with all the requirements of a criminal trial or even of
the usual administrative proceeding, the Due Process Clause does require application
during the adjudicatory hearing of -the essentials of due process and fair treat-
ment."' 6 -
Furthermore, application of certain criminal procedures to commitment
proceedings would benefit neither the psychopath nor the state, and, in fact,
often would interfere with a fair and just determination of the facts. For
example, the psychopath needs no constitutional right to remain silent, since
this right developed in order to allow an accused freedom from possible
self-incrimination. ' 66 A psychiatrist's examination of the psychopath is central
to a commitment proceeding.' 67 If an alleged psychopath could refuse to
submit to such examination on the grounds of a right to remain silent, the
state would be unable to meet whatever standard of proof the courts re-
quired. 168
Another right not necessary in psychopathy proceedings but required in
criminal proceedings is the right to public trial.' 69 Due to the mental
condition of the psychopath and the need for a speedy determination of his
illness, an informal hearing with appropriate criminal safeguards-but with-
out a gallery of onlookers-might be more appropriate than a public trial.
Within such limits, however, courts can make effective use of the criminal
161. This is a particularly important distinction, since the commentators have pointed out
that most offenders sentenced under the psychopathy laws are those convicted of minor offenses.
See note 12 supra. If this is true, these minor offenses are treated as serious ones. Governor
Thomas E. Dewey of New York vetoed the New York statute precisely for this reason. See text
accompanying note 187 infra.
162. 14 Cal. 3d at 317-18, 535 P.2d at 359, 121 Cal. Rptr. at 495.
163. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 481 (1972) ("[o]nce it is determined that due process
applies, the question remains what process is due").
164. See text accompanying notes 142-46 supra; Criminal Safeguards, supra note 5, at 621.
165. 397 U.S. at 359, quoting In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 30 (1967).
166. Civil Commitment, supra note 5, at 1306-07. This right also serves to maintain the
balance between the state and the individual and to protect a person's dignity and privacy. Id. at
1307.
167. But see note 150 supra.
168. Civil Commitment, supra note 5, at 1309.
169. U.S. Cost. amend. VI.
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nature of psychopathy commitment proceedings to expand due process
safeguards afforded the sex offender. They must make a selective determina-
tion of the rights involved by weighing the circumstances and effect of the
proceedings on the individual and the state.370
IV. MISCELLANEOUS
Georgia' 7 1 and Tennessee172 have psychopathy statutes which differ from
the defined categories outlined above. Unlike the other commitment statutes
these jurisdictions provide that the sex offender must properly serve the
statutory sentence 73 for the underlying felony at a state correctional facility
before he may be committed to a state mental hospital for an indeterminate
period on account of psychopathy or insanity.'
74
While both states provide for a psychopathic examination prior to such
determination of psychopathy, 175 the two states differ in their procedures for
psychopathic adjudication. Tennessee follows a traditional procedure. The
psychopathic determination is made only after the sex offender is allowed an
adversary hearing with counsel present. 176 The judge, as the sole trier of
facts, determines psychopathy at a civil trial. '77 Because of its similarity to
the Special Proceeding Commitment, the Tennessee statute is subject to the
constitutional infirmities and challenges stated above. 
17 8
170. See In re Ballay, 482 F.2d 648. 656-69 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
171. Ga. Code Ann. § 77-539 (1973).
172. Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 33-1303 to -1305 (Supp. 1974).
173. Ga. Code Ann. § 77-539 (1973) and Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 33-1303 to -1305 (Supp. 1974)
mandate that a person convicted of certain sexual crimes be imprisoned in a correctional facility.
Once the psychopath is criminally committed these two states differ in their procedures. Tile
Georgia offender must serve his time before he is examined for possible treatment. Ga. Code
Ann. § 77-539 (1973). The Tennessee offender, however, is examined "as soon as practicable after
admittance to the penal institution." Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-1303 (Supp. 1975). If the psychopath
can be successfully treated he will be so treated in prison for the duration of his sentence. Id.
§ 33-1304. In this sense, the Tennessee statute is somewhat similar to the alternative sentence
commitment statutes. It differs from those statutes in that the offender must remain in prison.
174. Ga. Code Ann. § 77-539 (1973); Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-1305 (Supp. 1975).
175. Ga. Code Ann. § 77-539 (1973); Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-1305 (Supp. 1975). An
examination is also given at time of eligibility for parole to determine if the prisoner is a sex
offender.
176. Tenn. Code Ann. § 33-1305 (Supp. 1975).
177. The statute does provide for a jury trial upon a petition for release after actual
commitment. Id.
178. See pt. III supra. Like the Special Proceeding Commitment, the Tennessee statute is
subject to the equal protection clause. This is because the psychopathic proceedings parallel those
of insanity commitment. See notes 101-13 supra and accompanying text. It is interesting to note
that in cases of commitment under the Tennessee Alcohol and Drug Treatment Law, tlhe
defendant is allowed notice, cross-examination, counsel, and a right to appeal. Tenn. Code Ann.
§ 33-811 (Supp. 1975).
Furthermore. since the procedure involves a separate proceeding, new findings of fact,
potential for indeterminate commitment, and a deprivation of liberty, Tenn. Code Ann.
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The Georgia statute, on the other hand, provides for novel procedures. The
sex offense involved in the prior criminal action is simply the catalyst for
initiation of mental illness proceedings. The order of commitment is made not
upon a finding of propensity to commit sex crimes or a finding of psychopathic
sexual behavior, but upon a general finding of mental illness. 179 Such a
statute, therefore, would be subject to the standards for insanity commitment
proceedings.' 80
Into this miscellaneous category also fall states which have repealed their
psychopathy laws or have never enacted such.'18 The history of New York
law on the subject, while not necessarily representative, is illustrative of the
complex problems surrounding the issue of sex offender commitment. The
New York legislature passed a sex offender statute in 1947.182 Governor
Thomas E. Dewey vetoed that statute18 3 and the state has never re-enacted a
psychopathy statute. The Governor disapproved this bill on four bases: the
statute allowed a finding of psychopathy by the lowest criminal court,' s4 it
placed responsibility for a determination of the psychopath's recovery upon
the Commissioner of Corrections,' 85 it did not provide adequate procedural
safeguards for the alleged sex offender, 8 6 and it did not distinguish different
types of psychopathy. 8 7 While aspects of the first three objections have been
analyzed above, 88 and some have been effectively dealt with in some states,
the fourth basis-classification among psychopaths-is an infirmity which has
not been cured.' s9
New York uses its existing criminal laws to deal with psychopaths and their
special needs.190 While the judge cannot order a psychopathic examination he
has the discretion to adjust the offender's sentence within limits prescribed by
§ 33-1305 (Supp. 1975), the due process requirements of the Special Proceeding Commitment
would also be applicable. See pt. III supra.
179. Ga. Code Ann. § 77-539 (1973) provides: "Should the hearing result in a finding that the
offender is mentally ill within the purview of section 88-507. 1, the district attorney shall ...
cause the offender to be hospitalized .... "
180. See generally Criminal Safeguards, supra note 5; Civil Commitment. supra note 3.
181. See note 22 supra.
182. S. 2790, 1947 N.Y. Leg.
183. New York State, Public Papers of Governor Dewey. 2i4-56 (1947). The Governor also
vetoed a statute passed in 1952 requiring the Commissioner of Corrections to file a special report
dealing with the administration, application, and enforcement of sex crimes.
184. Id. at 255.
183. Id.
186. Id. at 256.
187. Id. at 255.
188. See pts. II & III supra.
189. See note 161 supra and accompanying text.
190. A proposed bill, S. 8003, 1976 N.Y. Leg., would make New York an Alternative
Sentence Commitment state. Amending the criminal procedure law, it would provide that after a
sex offender's conviction, if his conduct is determined to be repetitive and compulsive, the court
must order him committed for treatment.
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the law.' 91 If the offender has had a history of felony convictions involving
sexual matters, the judge could invoke New York's persistent felony offender
statute' 92 and impose a longer term of imprisonment. Furthermore, the
absence of a psychopathic statute does not leave New York without recourse
if it desires to treat the offender. The state could institute insanity commit-
ment proceedings and commit the psychopath to a hospital as mentally ill, if
he is in fact so. ' 93 Accordingly, New York has the ability-though somewhat
limited- 94 to deal with sex offenders without the constitutional difficulties
encountered by the psychopathic statutes.
V. CONCLUSION
Three different approaches to the nation's psychopathy laws have been
examined. None of the categories of statutes provide complete or constitution-
ally adequate due process protections for the sex offender. The alternative
sentence commitment statute fails either to provide any due process rights at
all' 95 or only a bare minimum.' 96 Moreover, this entire approach to the
commitment problem must be seriously questioned by reason of the Supreme
Court's ruling in Specht v. Patterson. ,97 The special proceeding commitment
statutes' 98 as well as those of Georgia and Tennessee, 99 while providing the
greatest potential for adequate due process rights, still fail to recognize that
psychopathy commitment is penal in nature and therefore subject to a full
range of relevant protections. Even California, the most progressive of states
within the special proceeding category, does not as yet distinguish between
different degrees of psychopathy. 20 0 Finally, the New York approach, 20'
while not subject to due process challenges, attempts to deal with the problem
of sex offenders by avoiding the question of psychopathy altogether.
The law as it affects the psychopath is changing, however, and states are
now beginning to recognize the potential problems involved in determination
of sex offender status. Still, no adequate safeguards can be fully achieved
until the basis and need for these laws are reexamined. It is suggested
that psychopathy statutes must be based on an objective and realistic stan-
191. N.Y. Penal Law § 70.00 (McKinney 1975).
192. Id. § 70.10.
193. N.Y. Mental Hygiene Law § 70 (McKinney 1971). It should be noted again,
however, that not all psychopaths are insane. See note 3 supra and accompanying text. See also
note 107 supra, which indicates that rational distinctions exist between the care and custody of an
insane person and that of a psychopath.
194. If a particular psychopath could not be classified as insane, New York would have
serious constitutional problems in employing the mentally ill statute against him. See generally B.
Schwartz, Constitutional Law 193-94 (1974).
195. See notes 39-41 supra and accompanying text.
196. See notes 56, 65 supra and accompanying text.
197. 386 U.S. 605 (1967). See note 66 supra and accompanying text.
198. See note 21 supra.
199. See note 22 supra.
200. See note 161 supra and accompanying text.
201. See notes 191-94 supra and accompanying text. But see note 190 supra.
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dard of dangerousness. A psychopath who is not dangerous to himself or
society should not be deprived of liberty because of moralistic or subjective
standards which reflect a fear or hatred of sexual deviance. 20 2
Peter Sullivan
202. Thomas Szasz writes: "For such 'dangerousness,' I maintain, is but a form of secular
heresy; and, like heresy, it cannot, in the United States, be the ground for depriving a person of
any human right, especially of liberty. Perhaps the Supreme Court will yet so rule." N.Y.
Times, Aug. 4, 1975, at 19, col. 5. See generally Gels & Monahan, Controlling -Dangerous"
People, 423 Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science 142, 151-52 (January
1976).
